This paper reports new and unique firm-level survey evidence to investigate the microeconomic nature of the growth process and structural change in three transition countries, Romania, Bulgaria, and Hungary. In particular we investigate gross job creation and destruction in newly established private (de novo) firms and "traditional" ones, both state-owned and privatized firms, and find that the de novo private firms are the most dynamic in terms of job 1 We acknowledge the financial support from the Phare-Ace Project P96-6203-R. The financial support of the KUL research fund and the FWO is also gratefully acknowledged.
INTRODUCTION
In recent years a substantial theoretical literature has emerged on the process of economic restructuring in transition economies. As described by Blanchard et al. (1995) , there are two extreme views of transition. The first is that the main force behind the reform process involves the collapse of the state sector, which is not adapting to the changed market environment, combined with a slowly emerging private sector. The growth in the private sector is not sufficient to pick up the slack in the state sector, leading to high and persistent unemployment. Hence, unemployment slows down the desired restructuring of the state sector and other general reforms. It is for this reason that the optimal sequencing of reforms matters. While Aghion and Blanchard (1994) stress the role of unemployment in "blocking" reforms, Roland (1994) stresses the role of political constraints that necessitate a gradual approach to restructuring. The second extreme view is that the main force behind transition is the rapid growth of the private sector, which is sufficient to absorb the laid off workers in the state sector. In this case, unemployment is a consequence of a healthy process of reallocation. This does not exclude the possibility of a high unemployment pool; what matters is a high turnover of that pool resulting in efficient reallocation.
In this paper we investigate the microeconomic nature of the employment growth process in three transition countries, Romania, Bulgaria, and Hungary, by using a new and unique firm-level data set obtained by surveys carried out from December 1995 to February 1996. We measure performance in terms of gross job creation, destruction, reallocation, and net employment growth at the firm level. Gross job creation is the sum of all employment gains at expanding firms; gross job destruction refers to the sum of all employment losses at contracting firms expressed as a positive number. The sum of the two gives a measure of gross job reallocation.
Measures of gross job flows can also be interpreted as indicators of restructuring. An example can clarify this point. Suppose that the employment growth rate in the manufacturing sector is Ϫ2%. This could be the result of a gross job creation rate of 1% and a gross job destruction rate of 3%. Alternatively, this could be the result of a gross job creation rate of 10% and a gross job destruction rate of 12%. Obviously, the latter suggests a much more turbulent labor market than the former. This could be explained by factors such as labor market institutions and product market competition. It can also be interpreted as evidence of more active restructuring in firms and for the sector as a whole.
In the context of transition countries, it is interesting to investigate whether the turbulence in labor markets is relatively low or high. The latter suggests an active and dynamic process of restructuring. Also, in transition countries employment has been declining; yet, it is important to know whether despite the decline in employment there are also firms that have created jobs. In addition, a substantial reallocation of jobs between sectors will occur in transition countries. With market forces emerging, a number of traditional industries will disappear and a number of new ones will emerge. In the old system the service and trade sectors were underdeveloped, so that a reallocation of jobs and other resources from manufacturing to newly emerging sectors is expected. Within the manufacturing sector, a reallocation of jobs between different types of firms could also occur from, for instance, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to privatized and newly established private firms. These issues cannot be addressed by using macroeconomic data on employment, but they can be studied with gross job flows as is done in a number of applications to Western markets (Davis and Haltiwanger, 1992; Konings, 1995) .
Another important motivation of this paper is related to the evidence that is gradually accumulating on the relative performance and dynamism of various ownership structures in transition economies.
2 In particular, de novo private firms seem to outperform privatized and SOEs, with little difference in performance found in the two latter categories. The results in this paper provide new evidence on the nature of the growth and restructuring process of the de novo private sector and how these firms' behavior is different from that of the traditional firms, i.e., state-owned and privatized firms. We hope to gain some insights into the extent of the stock adjustment process and the potential for further growth once this process has come to an end (Blanchard et al., 1995) . In particular, one can expect rapid growth in the small and medium-sized enterprise sector (SME), followed by a slowdown once this niche has been filled.
Our results show that transition is characterized by an initial increase in job destruction, but over time job destruction decreases. Job creation remains low. The de novo private firms are the most dynamic in terms of job creation. Furthermore, in the early years of transition job reallocation occurs predominantly between sectors; in later years more within-sector job reallocation is observed. These results are discussed in Section 3. Section 4 uses regression analysis to explore a relationship between employment growth and firm level characteristics. We report evidence that de novo private firms consistently outperform state-owned and privatized enterprises. In addition, we find that SOEs are not significantly different in their employment behavior from privatized firms. Section 5 concludes the paper. We start in the next section with a description of the data.
DATA
The data are based on firm-level surveys in 431 enterprises in Romania, Bulgaria, and Hungary. Firm-level data that can be compared across countries in transition economies were, and still are, quite scarce. The available official statistics do not provide individual firm-level data. Balance-sheet information deposited at the national bank or other offices is not easily accessible. In the rare case when firm-level data are provided there is a significant minimum cut-off size for the firms and data are provided usually for a limited number of variables. More importantly, official data on newly established private firms are often missing and not reported because of the typical small size of new firms and/or registration lags. Yet, the group of de novo private firms can potentially play a crucial role in the process of transition; hence, acquiring more information on this group of firms is important (Richter and Schaffer, 1996) . For these reasons we collected firm-level information by carrying out surveys on the basis of personal interviews with the general manager and/or some other key managers of firms. The firms were selected from different business registers as well as from address books and data bases from local research institutes. The last source is valuable especially for selecting microfirms, since they are often too small to appear in any business register.
The sample was stratified in two: 50% of the firms were drawn from de novo or newly established private firms; the other half was drawn from state-owned and privatized enterprises. Previous empirical studies based on individual firmlevel data for Poland and Russia found a marked difference in performance between pretransition firms and de novo firms (Belka et al., 1995; Johnson and Loveman, 1995; Richter and Schaffer, 1996; Earle et al., 1996) . The de novo firms were selected in manufacturing, trade, and services. Traditional firms were selected mainly from the manufacturing sector.
3 There was no additional sample restriction imposed, except that the regional distribution at the level of the province had to reflect the geographical concentration.
The interviews for Bulgaria, Romania, and Hungary were performed during the period of December 1995 to February 1996. We covered 431 firms, of which 115 were in Bulgaria, 100 in Hungary, and 119 in Romania. The average duration of the interview was about 2 hours. The questionnaire covered various topics such as aspects of industrial relations, competition, employment, firm organization, and ownership. 4 Often the interviewers visited the firm twice or contacted the firms by telephone after the first interview. This was necessary to clarify some answers and to obtain answers to certain questions that could not be given immediately. For instance, we asked a retrospective question on the size of the workforce for which either the respondent had to consult his files or the appropriate department of the firm had to be contacted. We constructed three ownership categories, de novo private firms, 100% SOEs, and privatized firms. The de novo firms are those that have been private since they were established and for which the date of operation starts after 1989. 5 This category of firms does not contain spin-offs from previously SOEs or firms that merely changed their name. This was controlled for using information from a question on the ownership history of the firm. Firms that indicated that they had previously been a part of a SOE were not included in the de novo group.
The second category refers to firms that are 100% in state hands. The third category includes privatized firms. Privatized firms are defined as firms that started operating before transition and in which the state owns less than 100% of the shares. In Bulgaria and Hungary the majority of the privatized enterprises in our sample was completely in private hands, while in Romania only 15.6% of the privatized firms was fully in this category. Within the subsample of traditional firms, the selection of state-owned and privatized firms was random. Business registers were used to draw these firms. Table 1 gives the sample structure and summary statistics on size and employment growth for those three categories in each country. The average size of a de novo firm is typically small although in Hungary the average employment level of 102 is substantially larger than it is in Romania and Bulgaria. This could reflect the more advanced state of reforms in Hungary. A few de novo firms show a relatively high employment size; these firms appear to benefit from substantial foreign capital investment. 6 The average employment growth in de novo firms is positive in all three countries with Romania and Bulgaria having higher growth rates than Hungary.
7 Note that the average growth rate of privatized firms in all three countries is negative and that it is very similar to that of SOEs.
One potential problem with the measurement of de novo firms is selectivity was facing were not answered very well as this information was often perceived to be highly sensitive. Therefore, in the analysis, these variables could not be used. 5 If the second restriction was not included, there would be a few firms that were private since they were established and started to operate before the communist period early in this century. We do not consider them to be de novo firms. 6 In the Hungarian sample, the maximum employment size for de novo firms is 1190. This observation is quite an outlier. In this firm, foreign private investors own 68% of the assets. For the Romanian sample almost all de novo firms have a size lower than 100. Only one firm has an employment size of 500. In this firm, 99% of the shares is owned by foreign private investors. The second largest Romanian de novo firm has a size of 120. It is 100% owned by private domestic investors and is a fast growing firm producing clothes of which 80% is exported. 7 The very high growth rate for de novo firms in Romania is driven partly by an outlier with a growth rate of 49. In the analysis, we excluded this firm. bias in the sample. Since the data were collected by interviews at one point in time, we only captured the surviving de novo firms and therefore the employment growth could be biased upward. In the regression analysis in Section 4 we include a number of control factors which potentially are correlated with the survivor process; hence, we control for survivorship bias indirectly.
RESULTS ON JOB CREATION AND DESTRUCTION
In this section we begin with showing job creation and destruction rates for the three countries and then consider different splits of the sample. We look at job creation and destruction rates according to ownership type and according to sector. Following the literature (Davis and Haltiwanger, 1992; Boeri and Cramer, 1992; Konings, 1995) the gross job creation rate (JC) is derived by summing all job gains in expanding firms expressed as a fraction of all jobs in the sector, economy, or size class a year earlier.
8 Similarly, the gross job destruction rate (JD) is the sum of all job losses in contracting firms relative to the total number 8 Often in the literature, the denominator has average employment over 2 years instead of of jobs. The sum of the two gives a measure for job reallocation, called the gross job reallocation rate (JR), while the difference gives the net employment growth rate (NET) in a sector or the economy. In Table 2 we report the job flow measures for the entire sample for the years 1991 and 1994. Since retrospective questions on employment were asked, it is possible to compute the job creation and destruction rates from 1991 onward. The effect of the reforms is seen in all three countries as indicated by the high job destruction rate and the low job creation rate in 1991. By 1994, the job destruction rate has decreased, but the job creation rate remains very low. The low job creation rate is consistent with the low outflow rates from unemployment reported for countries in transition.
A potential problem with these rates is that they refer to continuing firms only.
employment from a year earlier. a The number of firms refers to the number of firms with positive employment in both 1993 and 1994, a necessary condition to compute job flows.
b JC, job creation rate; JD, job destruction rate; the denominator of the overall job creation (destruction) rate is the total lagged employment, the denominator for the job creation (destruction) rate for each ownership category refers to the total lagged employment of that category.
We do not have information on exit rates of firms. So the reported job destruction rates can be seen as lower bounds to the true rates. For the year 1991, Konings et al. (1996) use a larger sample for Poland and find a job destruction rate of 17.6%. When an attempt to include job destruction resulting from exit was made, the result increased to 18.2%. Often identifying exit proves to be quite difficult as it is sometimes not possible to distinguish between an exit and a change in name or a breaking up of an enterprise.
In what follows, we do not focus on how firms responded to the initial shocks of 1991 and 1992; instead we concentrate on the data for 1994. It is reasonable to assume that the initial shocks had been absorbed by 1994. In Table 2 , for 1994 only, we look also at the gross job flow measures for the three countries according to ownership, de novo, SOE, and privatized firms; the latter two we refer to as traditional firms. The difference between the traditional firms and the de novo firms is striking. The de novo sector has the highest job creation rate and lowest job destruction rate. In Bulgaria and Romania the job creation rate in the de novo firms outweighs the job destruction rate. In contrast, in Hungary they are about equal. This suggests that Hungary has reached a steady state situation, defined as a situation in which employment growth is zero; hence, job creation equals job destruction.
It is interesting to note that in Hungary the job destruction rate in de novo firms is higher than in SOEs. Of course, also the job creation rate is much higher. This indicates that in Hungarian de novo firms there exists a process of deep restructuring, characterized by simultaneous creation and destruction of jobs leaving net employment growth unchanged. This could mean that unproductive jobs are destroyed and replaced by more productive ones, implying a healthy reallocation process of Schumpeterian competition. In Romania and Bulgaria, job creation in de novo firms outweighs job destruction, which suggests a stock adjustment process in which some market niches are being filled up (Blanchard et al., 1995) . We will test for the statistical significance of these ownership effects in the next section when we look at firm level employment growth. The reported gross job flows are firm level flows that are aggregated up to one figure for each ownership class (see definition in previous section).
In order to assess the contribution of the different ownership categories in total job creation, we computed the job creation and destruction shares of the respective categories as a fraction of the total number of jobs created and destroyed in the sample. The last 3 columns in Table 2 show the results. In Romania and Bulgaria, more than 60% of all jobs are created in de novo firms, although they account only for a very small fraction of total employment in the sample. In Hungary, this share is only 31%, but it is still substantial given that the weight of this category is only 7% in the sample. One possible reason for the lower job creation share in Hungary is the timing of the adjustment process; it could indicate an emerging stock adjustment problem (Blanchard et al., 1995) . The filling of the small and median enterprise (SME) niche in Hungary started earlier and is now reaching levels comparable to those in other market economies. Thus the initial explosive growth of de novo SMEs, as reflected in Romania and Bulgaria, is a catching-up effect. Once this is over, growth will slow down. Finally, in traditional firms virtually no new jobs are created, which indicates that these firms are still adjusting to the initial shocks characterized by reducing overmanning levels. Moreover, in privatized firms job destruction is higher than in SOEs, suggesting that initial restructuring occurs at a faster rate in privatized firms than in SOEs.
The above results do not consider sector differences. However, the manufacturing sector, which is characterized by more traditional firms, should exhibit a different pattern of job flows than the service sector, which is a relatively young sector. The latter was virtually nonexistent in the old system. In Table 3 , we show the gross job flows for three broadly defined sectors in our sample, manufacturing, trade, and services for the year 1994 only. It is interesting to note that in the manufacturing sector the job creation rate is very low, while the job destruction rate is high in all three countries. There is no asymmetry between the job creation rate and the job destruction rate in the trade sector, suggesting that this sector may be in equilibrium. The service sector is characterized by a very high job creation rate, but a low job destruction rate, which reflects the fact that most de novo firms are in the service sector.
The gross job reallocation rate is lowest in manufacturing, followed by trade and then by services. This is true in all three countries. In other words, the reallocation of jobs and the patterns of job creation and destruction are very different in different sectors. This could be the consequence of different potential market niches or of varying degrees of competition faced by firms in these sectors. While Table 3 suggests that there is a substantial reallocation of jobs between firms especially in the trade sector, it is also possible that there is considerable reallocation of jobs between sectors. To assess the importance of job reallocation within and between sectors, we compute the following index of intra-industry job reallocation (IIJ):
where j stands for sector. If this index equals 0, job reallocation occurs entirely between sectors; if it equals 1, job reallocation occurs entirely within sectors. Table 4 shows this index for the years 1991-1994. The pattern for the three countries is very similar. While at the start of transition, job reallocation occurred predominantly between sectors, later on in the transition job reallocation occurred also within sectors. This is especially so in Hungary, where the index in 1994 equals 0.70. The severe misallocation of resources under the old system indicates that reallocation of labor between sectors should be higher at the start of transition than later as more market-oriented allocation of resources emerges. With transition well under way a "healthy" process of reallocation takes place within sectors. Of course, our sectoral classification is crude and more information can probably be revealed if one uses a more disaggregated classification. With the current data this was not possible.
From the cross-tabulations in this section we discover mainly three results:
1. In terms of gross job creation and destruction there exists substantial differences regarding the relative dynamism of de novo versus traditional firms.
2. The observed ownership differences might be correlated to sector effects.
3. Hungary appears to be more advanced in the transition, while in Bulgaria and Romania significant adjustment is still underway.
In the next section we move to the microeconomic approach of modeling employment growth, which will allow us to make an assessment of the statistical significance of the above results. 
WHAT DRIVES EMPLOYMENT GROWTH?
In this section, we move from considering job creation and destruction measures for some aggregates to analyzing the determinants of job creation and destruction at the level of the individual firm. The process of job creation and destruction is ultimately linked to the underlying process of firm growth and thus, in turn, determines industry structure. Our basic objective is to determine statistically significant effects on firm growth that can be attributed to ownership structure, after taking into account size, sector, learning, and other effects. Following Konings et al. (1996) we specify a relationship for the average growth rate of firm i,
where subscript i stands for firm i, n is employment, d ϭ 1994-tЊ, with t°standing for the start-up year or 1990 for the traditional firms, which reflects the initial conditions firms were facing at the start of transition, a is age of the firm, own represents ownership dummies, and ⑀ is an error term.
Age reflects the learning experience of the firm. The initial size indicates the potential to capture market opportunities at the start of transition or at the start of the new firm. For established market economies, both age and initial size are found to have a negative effect on employment growth (Dunne et al., 1989) . Other contains variables that control for sector, competition in the product market, and labor market characteristics.
Following Hamilton (1998) we used robust regression analysis to estimate the above equation. Robust estimation achieves almost OLS efficiency in situations in which the error term is independently but not normally distributed. We believe this to be a sensible approach given that there are a number of outliers in both categories of firms and that we are dealing with transition data.
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Tables 5a, 5b, and 5c present the results for Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania, respectively. In the first column we allow only for an intercept effect due to ownership, while in the second column we also allow for slope effects. The residual category in the regressions is the SOE. Our discussion is based on the second column. Starting with Bulgaria, there is a negative initial size effect for SOEs of Ϫ0.04; for de novo firms this size effect is amplified as can be seen from the interaction term. Interestingly, the age effect is absent for SOEs and privatized firms. This could be explained by the fact that traditional firms are typically very old (the average age is over 30 years). If there are significant decreasing returns to learning, the learning effect should vanish after a few years. The de novo firms, in contrast, have a negative age effect. A negative age effect is found because older firms tend to be closer to their optimal (efficient) size and have therefore less growth potential. Finally, and most importantly, de novo private firms have a significantly higher growth rate than the SOEs, although the growth rate differential decreases with age and size. These negative age and size effects are typically found in market economies and are consistent with learning models of firm growth which are derived from the assumption of profit maximization (Dunne et al., 1989) . Another striking result from this regression is that privatized firms do not have a statistically significant different growth rate than SOEs. Thus privatized firms may not behave that differently from SOEs. This is not surprising if privatized firms are insider controlled. In Hungary, the results are different. Irrespective of the ownership type, we do not find a statistically significant effect of initial size. Age has a negative and statistically significant effect only for the de novo firms. Finally, we do not find a statistically significant ownership effect. This could reflect the stage of transi- tion that Hungary is in. While de novo private firms outperform traditional ones in the early phases of transition, this is no longer the case when market reforms are implemented and the traditional firms passed the initial restructuring phase. In Romania the de novo firms perform significantly better than the SOEs. Moreover, just as is the case in Bulgaria, privatized firms have on average the same employment growth rates as SOEs. Also, the growth differential between de novo firms and traditional ones disappears with initial size, but not with age. Thus, while in Bulgaria we observed that there is also a negative age effect for the newly established private firms, this is not so for Romania. From the above, we observe a common feature for both Bulgaria and Romania. After controlling for size and life cycle effects, de novo private firms outperform traditional ones, thus confirming our earlier observations on gross job creation and destruction. The creation of an entrepreneurial environment to stimulate the establishment of new private firms is an important policy consideration for transition countries. The results for Hungary, however, suggest that ownership effects vanish as transition progresses, perhaps due to increasing competitive pressure. We do not have any information on exit and survival rates of newly established private firms and obviously this might bias our results. However, we do control for sector effects that might capture different exit rates. In the third column of Tables 5a-5c we control for potential competitive effects. This is another way of controlling for the survivorship bias in our sample, as competitive pressure is related to the probability of exit. In addition, it is also interesting to investigate whether competition has any effect in transition economies, where presumably competition is emerging faster in Hungary than in Romania and Bulgaria.
In the survey, managers were asked whether their firm was the dominant one, whether they faced between two and four rivals, or whether they faced more than four competitors. We created a dummy, comp, equal to 1 if their firm faced more than four competitors and equal to 0 otherwise. This is a survey-based measure of competition and refers therefore to the perceived competition in the relevant product market. It is also the only possible way of obtaining information on the degree of competition in transition countries for industry level measures of concentration are not available and if they are it is not clear what they reveal given the inherited system of heavy industry. We also interacted the comp variable with the sector in which the firm is operating. This is to take into account the fact that five competitors in the service sector may not be the same as five competitors in manufacturing. So, by interacting with sector, we test whether the competition effect varies with the type of industry.
The higher degree of competition in Hungary in comparison to the other two countries is reflected by the number of firms that answered affirmatively to the competition question. In the Hungarian sample, 79% of the firms responded that they had more than four major competitors on their market, while in Bulgaria the figure was 66% and in Romania it was 50%. In column (3) we look at the effect of competition on employment growth. We find that for Bulgaria competition has a negative effect in the trade sector, as can be seen from the interaction term between competition and the trade sector dummy, but not in the manufacturing and service sector. The latter can be seen from the direct effect of competition since the service sector is the benchmark category that is left out. Also in Romania, competition has a negative impact on employment growth in the trade sector, but a positive effect in the manufacturing sector. Finally, in Hungary we find a positive effect of competition in all sectors. In Western market economies competition is thought to lead to better economic performance and more efficiency. Our results suggest that this is true for Hungarian firms. The negative effects found in the trade sector in Bulgaria and Romania can suggest that we are picking up the early stages of competition in which inefficient firms in the trade sector experience negative effects of high competition.
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we investigated the process of restructuring in terms of job creation, destruction, and firm level employment growth in Romania, Bulgaria, and Hungary. To this end, we used a unique firm-level data set based on surveys in 431 state owned, privatized and newly established private enterprises.
We started with reporting and discussing gross job flows defined over various levels of aggregation (country, sector, ownership). The main findings can be summarized as follows:
2. The observed ownership differences might be correlated to sector effects. In addition, as we move in the transition there occurs more within-sector job reallocation than between-sector job reallocation.
In the second part of the paper we analyzed firm level employment growth in a regression analysis which resulted in a confirmation of the initial observations on gross job flows. In particular, after controlling for sector, life-cycle, and size effects de novo private firms relative to SOEs and privatized firms have a statistically significant positive effect on firm level employment growth in Bulgaria and Romania. We do not find this effect for Hungary, which could be a result of its advanced stage of development. We tested also whether competitive pressure had any effect on firm level employment growth. In Hungary, competition has a positive effect on employment growth in all sectors. In contrast, in Bulgaria and Romania we found that competition had a negative effect in the trade sector and no effect in manufacturing. Alternative measures for competition could be used and developed. Further research on the effects of competition on firm performance in transition countries should give more detailed insights. In particular, in the context of job creation and destruction, this paper suggests that a process of Schumpeterian competition in transition countries might be quite important. Restructuring means the destruction of unproductive jobs, which are replaced by new more productive jobs, often as a consequence of technological innovation. Investigating these issues with better and more representative data rank high on our research agenda.
